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Abstract—This paper investigates the physical layer security of
non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) in large-scale networks
with invoking stochastic geometry. Both single-antenna and
multiple-antenna aided transmission scenarios are considered,
where the base station (BS) communicates with randomly dis-
tributed NOMA users. In the single-antenna scenario, we adopt
a protected zone around the BS to establish an eavesdropper-
exclusion area with the aid of careful channel-ordering of the
NOMA users. In the multiple-antenna scenario, artificial noise
is generated at the BS for further improving the security of a
beamforming-aided system. In order to characterize the secrecy
performance, we derive new exact expressions of the security
outage probability for both single-antenna and multiple-antenna
aided scenarios. To obtain further insights, 1) for the single
antenna scenario, we perform secrecy diversity order analysis of
the selected user pair. The analytical results derived demonstrate
that the secrecy diversity order is determined by the specific
user having the worse channel condition among the selected
user pair; and 2) for the multiple-antenna scenario, we derive
the asymptotic secrecy outage probability, when the number of
transmit antennas tends to infinity. Monte Carlo simulations are
provided for verifying the analytical results derived and to show
that: i) The security performance of the NOMA networks can
be improved by invoking the protected zone and by generating
artificial noise at the BS; and ii) The asymptotic secrecy outage
probability is close to the exact secrecy outage probability.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, physical layer security, non-
orthogonal multiple access, stochastic geometry
I. INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented expansion of new Internet-enabled smart
devices, applications and services is expediting the develop-
ment of the fifth generation (5G) networks, which aim for
substantially increasing the throughput of the fourth generation
(4G) networks. In addition to the key technologies such as
large-scale multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) solutions,
heterogeneous networks and millimeter wave, as well as
novel multiple access (MA) techniques should be invoked for
improving the spectral efficiency. The existing MA techniques
can be primarily classified into two main categories, namely
orthogonal multiple access and non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA), by distinguishing whether a specific resource block
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can be occupied by more than one user [2]. More specifically,
upon investigating the multiplexing gain gleaned from the
different domains, the NOMA technique can be further clas-
sified as code-domain NOMA and power-domain NOMA [3].
Power-domain NOMA1, which has been recently proposed
for the 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) initiative [4], is
deemed to have a superior spectral efficiency [5, 6]. It has
also been pointed out that NOMA has the potential to be
integrated with existing MA paradigms, since it exploits the
new dimension of the power domain. The key idea of NOMA
is to ensure that multiple users can be served within a given
resource slot (e.g., time/frequency), by applying successive in-
terference cancellation (SIC). The concept of SIC, which was
first proposed by Cover in 1972 [7], constitutes a promising
technique, since it imposes lower complexity than the joint
decoding approach [8].
Hence NOMA techniques have received remarkable atten-
tion both in the world of academia and industry [9–13]. Ding
et al. [9] investigated the performance of the NOMA downlink
for randomly roaming users. It was shown that NOMA is
indeed capable of achieving a better performance than their
traditional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) counter parts.
By considering the user fairness of a NOMA system, a user-
power allocation optimization problem was addressed by Tim-
otheou and Krikidis [10]. A cooperative simultaneous wireless
power transfer (SWIPT) aided NOMA protocol was proposed
by Liu et al. [11], where a NOMA user benefitting from good
channel conditions acts as an energy harvesting source in order
to assist a NOMA user suffering from poor channel condi-
tions. With the goal of maximizing the energy efficiency of
transmission in multi-user downlink NOMA scenarios, Zhang
et al. [14] proposed an efficient power allocation technique
capable of supporting the data rate required by each user. To
further improve the performance of NOMA systems, multiple
antennas were introduced in [12, 13]. More particularly, the
application of multiple-input single-output (MISO) solution to
NOMA was investigated by Choi et al. [12], where a two-stage
beamforming strategy was proposed. Power optimization was
invoked by Sun et al. [13] for maximizing the ergodic capacity
of MIMO aided NOMA systems. As a further advance, a
massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) aided hybrid
heterogenous NOMA framework was proposed for downlink
1Hence in this paper, we focus our attention on the family of power-domain
NOMA schemes. We simply use “NOMA” to refer to “power-domain NOMA”
in the following.
2transmission by Liu et al. [15]. The impact of the locations
of users and interferers was investigated by using stochastic
geometry approaches.
Given the broadcast nature of wireless transmissions, the
concept of physical (PHY) layer security (PLS) was proposed
by Wyner as early as 1975 from an information-theoretical
perspective [16]. This research topic has sparked of wide-
spread recent interests. To elaborate, PLS has been considered
from a practical perspective in [17–21]. Specifically, robust
beamforming transmission was conceived in conjunction with
applying artificial noise (AN) for mitigating the impact of
imperfect channel state information (CSI) in MIMO wiretap
channels was proposed by Mukherjee and Swindlehurst [17].
Ding et al. [18] invoked relay-aided cooperative diversity for
increasing the capacity of the desired link. More particularly,
the impact of eavesdroppers on the diversity and multiplexing
gains was investigated both in single-antenna and multiple-
antenna scenarios. Additionally, the tradeoffs between secure
performance and reliability in the presence of eavesdropping
attacks was identified by Zou et al. [20]. Furthermore, the
physical layer security of D2D communication in large-scale
cognitive radio networks was investigated by Liu et al. [21]
with invoking a wireless power transfer model, where the
positions of the power beacons, the legitimate and the eaves-
dropping nodes were modeled using stochastic geometry.
Recently, various PHY layer techniques, such as cooperative
jamming [22] and AN [23] aided solutions were proposed
for improving the PLS, even if the eavesdroppers have better
channel conditions than the legitimate receivers. A popular
technique is to generate AN at the transmitter for degrading
the eavesdroppers’ reception, which was proposed by Goel and
Negi in [23]. In contrast to the traditional view, which regards
noise and interference as a detrimental effect, generating
AN at the transmitter is capable of improving the security,
because it degrades the channel conditions of eavesdroppers
without affecting those of the legitimate receivers. An AN-
based multi-antenna aided secure transmission scheme affected
by colluding eavesdroppers was considered by Zhou and
McKay [24] for the scenarios associated both with perfect and
imperfect CSI at both the transmitter and receiver. As a further
development, the secrecy enhancement achieved in wireless
Ad Hoc networks was investigated by Zhang et al. [25], with
the aid of both beamforming and sectoring techniques. By
simultaneously considering matched filter precoding and AN
generation techniques, the secure transmission strategies for a
multi-user massive MIMO systems was investigated by Wu et
al. [26]. Very recently, the PLS of a single-input single-output
(SISO) NOMA system was studied by Zhang et al. [27], with
the objective of maximizing the secrecy sum rate of multiple
users.
A. Motivation and Contribution
As mentioned above, PLS has been studied in various
scenarios, but there is still a paucity of research contributions
on investigating the security issues of NOMA, which motivates
this contribution. Note that the employment of SIC in NOMA
results in a unique interference status at the receivers, which
makes the analysis of the PLS of NOMA different from that
of OMA. In this paper, we specifically consider the scenario
of large-scale networks, where a base station (BS) supports
randomly roaming NOMA users. In order to avoid sophisti-
cated high-complexity message detection at the receivers, a
user pairing technique is adopted for ensuring that only two
users share a specific orthogonal resource slot, which can be
readily separated by low-complexity SIC. A random number
of eavesdroppers are randomly positioned on an infinite two-
dimensional plane according to a homogeneous Poisson point
process (PPP). An eavesdropper-exclusion zone is introduced
around the BS for improving the secrecy performance of the
large-scale networks considered in which no eavesdroppers
are allowed to roam. This ‘disc’ was referred to as a protected
zone in [25, 28, 29]. Specifically, we consider both a single-
antenna scenario and a multiple-antenna scenario at the base
station (BS). 1) For the single-antenna scenario, M NOMA
users are randomly roaming in an finite disc (user zone) with
the quality-order of their channel conditions known at the BS.
For example, the m-th NOMA user is channel-quality order
of m. In this case, the m-th user is paired with the n-th
user for transmission within the same resource slot; 2) For
the multiple-antenna scenario, we invoke beamforming at the
BS for generating AN. In order to reduce the complexity of
channel ordering of MISO channels for NOMA, we partitioned
the circular cell of Fig. 1 into an internal disc and an external
ring. We select one user from the internal disc and another
from the external ring to be paired together for transmission
within the same resource slot using a NOMA protocol. The
primary contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We investigate the secrecy performance of large-scale
NOMA networks both for a single-antenna aided and a
multiple-antenna assisted scenario at the BS. A protected
zone synonymously referred to as the eavesdropper-
exclusion area, is invoked in both scenarios for improving
the PLS. Additionally, we propose to generate AN at
the BS in the multiple-antenna aided scenario for further
enhancing the secrecy performance.
• For the single-antenna scenario, we derive the exact
analytical expressions of the secrecy outage probabil-
ity (SOP) of the selected pair of NOMA users, when
relying on channel ordering. We then further extend on
the secrecy diversity analysis and derive the expressions
of asymptotic SOP. The results derived confirm that: 1)
for the selected pair, the m-th user is capable of attaining
a secrecy diversity order of m; 2) the secrecy diversity
order is determined by the one associated with the worse
channel condition between the paired users.
• For the multiple-antenna scenario, we derive the exact
analytical expressions of the SOP in conjunction with AN
generated at the BS. To gain further insights, we assume
having a large antenna array and derive the expressions
of SOP, when the number of antennas tends to infinity.
The results derived confirm that increasing the number
of antennas has no effect on the received signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdroppers,
when the BS is equipped with a large antenna array.
3• It is shown that: 1) the SOP can be reduced both by
extending the protected zone and by generating AN at the
BS; 2) the asymptotic SOP results of our large antenna
array analysis is capable of closely approximating the
exact secrecy outage probability; 3) there is an optimal
desired signal-power and AN power sharing ratio, which
minimizes the SOP in the multi-antenna scenario.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a
single-antenna transmission scenario is investigated in random
wireless networks, where channel ordering of the NOMA users
is relied on. In Section III, a multiple-antenna transmission
scenario is investigated, which relies on generating AN at the
BS. Our numerical results are presented in Section IV for
verifying our analysis, which is followed by our conclusions
in Section V.
II. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY IN RANDOM WIRELESS
NETWORKS WITH CHANNEL ORDERING
As shown in Fig. 1, we focus our attention on a secure
downlink communication scenario. In the scenario considered,
a BS communicates with M legitimate users (LUs) in the
presence of eavesdroppers (Eves). We assume that the M users
are divided into M/2 orthogonal pairs. Each pair is randomly
allocated to a single resource block, such as a time slot or
an orthogonal frequency band. For simplicity, we only focus
our attention on investigating a typical pair of users in this
treatise. Random user-pairing is adopted in this work2. For
each pair, the NOMA transmission protocol is invoked. It is
assumed that BS is located at the center of a disc, denoted by
D, which has a coverage radius of RD (which is defined as
the user zone for NOMA [9]). The M randomly roaming LUs
are uniformly distributed within the disc. A random number of
Eves is distributed across an infinite two-dimensional plane,
which are assumed to have powerful detection capabilities and
can overhear the messages of all orthogonal RBs, i.e. time
slots or frequency slots. The spatial distribution of all Eves is
modeled using a homogeneous PPP, which is denoted by Φe
and it is associated with the density λe. It is assumed that the
Eves can be detected, provided that they are close enough to
BS. Therefore, an Eve-exclusion area having a radius of rp is
introduced. Additionally, all channels are assumed to impose
quasi-static Rayleigh fading, where the channel coefficients are
constant for each transmission block, but vary independently
between different blocks.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that all the channels
between the BS and LUs obey |h1|2 ≤ · · ·|hm|2 ≤ · · ·|hn|2 ≤
···|hM |2. Both the the small-scale fading and the path loss are
incorporated into the ordered channel gain. Again, we assume
that the m-th user and the n-th user (m < n) are paired
for transmission in the same resource slot. Without loss of
generality, we focus our attention on a single selected pair
of users in the rest of the paper. In the NOMA transmission
2We note that however sophisticated user pairing is capable of enhancing
the performance of the networks considered [11], which is set aside for our
future work.
DR
∞
User Eavesdropper
pr
Base station
Fig. 1: Network model for secure NOMA transmission in
single-antenna scenario, where rp, RD, and ∞ is the radius
of the Eve-exclusion area, NOMA user zone, and an infinite
two dimensional plane for Eves, respectively.
protocol, more power should be allocated to the user suffering
from worse channel condition [5, 6]. Therefore, the power
allocation coefficients satisfy the conditions that am > an
and am + an = 1. By stipulating this assumption, SIC can
be invoked by the n-th user for first detecting the specific
user having a higher transmit power (TX-power), who hence
has a less interference-infested signal. Accordingly, the m-
th user’s signal is then remodulated and deducted from the
original composite signal. This procedure then directly delivers
the decontaminated lower-TX-power signal of the n-th user
itself3. We assume having fixed power allocation sharing
between two users, but optimal power sharing strategies are
capable of further enhancing the performance of the networks
considered, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Based
on the aforementioned assumptions, the instantaneous SINR
of the m-th user and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the
n-th user can be written as:
γBm =
am|hm|2
an|hm|2 + 1ρb
, (1)
γBn = ρban|hn|2, (2)
respectively. We introduce the convenient concept of transmit
SNR ρb = PTσ2
b
, where PT is the TX-power of composite signal
at the BS and σ2b is the variance of the additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at the LUs, noting that this is not a physically
measurable quantity owing to their geographic separation.
Perfectly flawless detection is assumed in this treatise, which
is realistic at today’s state-of-the-art with the aid of iterative
turbo-detection techniques [30, 31]. Additionally, a bounded
path loss model is used for guaranteeing that there is a practical
path-loss, which is higher than one even for small distances.
3It is assumed that perfect SIC is achieved at the n-th user, although
achieving perfect SIC may be a non-trivial task. As a consequence, our
analytical results may over-estimate the attainable secrecy performance of
networks. Our future work will relax this idealized simplifying assumption,
perhaps by analyzing both the connection outage probability and the secrecy
outage probability of the networks considered, with the aid the results derived
in this treatise.
4We consider the worst-case scenario of large-scale networks,
in which the Eves are assumed to have powerful detection
capabilities [25, 32]. Specifically, by applying multiuser detec-
tion techniques, the multiuser data stream received from BS
can be distinguished by the Eves, upon subtracting interference
generated by the superposed signals from each other. In fact,
this assumption overestimates the Eves’ multi-user decodabil-
ity. In the scenario considered, all the CSIs of the LUs are
assumed to be known at BS. However, the CSIs of Eves are
assumed to be unknown at the BS. The most detrimental Eve
is not necessarily the nearest one, but the one having the best
channel to BS. Non-colluding eavesdroppers are considered in
this work. Therefore, the instantaneous SNR of detecting the
information of the m-th user and the n-th user at the most
detrimental Eve can be expressed as follows:
γEκ = ρeaκ max
e∈Φe,de≥rp
{
|ge|2L (de)
}
. (3)
It is assumed that κ ∈ {m,n}, ρe = PTσ2e is the transmit SNR
with σ2e being the variance of the AWGN at Eves. Additionally,
ge is defined as the small-scale fading coefficient associated
with ge ∼ CN (0, 1), L (de) = 1dαe is the path loss, and de is
the distance from Eves to BS. Note that due to the existence of
the Eve-exclusion area (we assume rp > 1), it is not required
to bound the path loss for Eves since de will always be larger
than one.
A. New Channel Statistics
In this subsection, we derive several new channel statistics
for LUs and Eves, which will be used for deriving the secrecy
outage probability in the next subsection.
Lemma 1. Assuming M randomly located NOMA users in
the disc of Fig. 1, the cumulative distribution function (CDF)
FγBn of the n-th LU is given by
FγBn (x) ≈ ϕn
M−n∑
p=0
(
M − n
p
)
(−1)p
n+ p
×
∑
S˜
p
n
(
n+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
K=0
bqkk
)
e
−
K∑
k=0
qkck
x
ρban , (4)
where K is a complexity-vs-accuracy tradeoff parameter,
bk = −ωK
√
1− φ2k (φk + 1), b0 = −
K∑
k=1
bk, ck = 1 +[
RD
2 (φk + 1)
]α
, ωK =
π
K
, φk = cos
(
2k−1
2K π
)
, S˜pn ={
(q0, q1, · · · , qK)|
K∑
i=0
qi = n+ p
}
,
(
n+p
q0+···+qK
)
= (n+p)!
q0!···qK !
and ϕn = M !(M−n)!(n−1)! .
Proof: See Appendix A .
Lemma 2. Assuming M randomly positioned NOMA
users in the disc of Fig. 1, the CDF FγBm of the m-
th LU is given in (5) at the top of next page, where
U (x) =
{
1, x > 0
0, x ≤ 0 is the unit step function , and S˜
p
m ={
(q0, q1, · · · , qK)|
K∑
i=0
qi = m+ p
}
.
Proof: Based on (1), the CDF of FγBm (x) can be
expressed as
FγBm (x) =


Pr
{
|hm|2 < x
(am − anx) ρb
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φm
, x < am
an
1, x ≥ am
an
.
(6)
To derive the CDF of FγBm (x), Φm can be expressed as
Φm = F|hm|2
(
x
(am−anx)ρb
)
. Based on (A.5), interchanging
the parameters m → n and applying y = x(am−anx)ρb , we
obtain
Φm = ϕm
M−m∑
p=0
(
M −m
p
)
(−1)p
m+ p
×
∑
S˜
p
m
(
m+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
k=0
bqkk
)
e
−
K∑
k=0
qkck
x
(am−anx)ρb . (7)
By substituting (7) into (6), with the aid of the unit step
function, the CDF of FγBm (x) can be obtained. The proof
is completed.
Lemma 3. Assuming that the eavesdroppers obey the PPP
distribution and the Eve-exclusion zone has a radius of rp,
the probability density function (PDF) fγEκ of the most
detrimental Eve (where κ ∈ {m,n} ) is given by
fγEκ (x) = µκ1e
−
µκ1Γ(δ,µκ2x)
xδ
(
µδκ2e
−µκ2x
x
+
δΓ (δ, µκ2x)
xδ+1
)
,
(8)
where µκ1 = δπλe(ρeaκ)δ, µκ2 =
rαp
ρeaκ
, δ = 2
α
and Γ(·, ·) is
the upper incomplete Gamma function.
Proof: To derive the PDF of fγEκ (x), we have to compute
the CDF of FγEκ firstly as
FγEκ (x) =EΦe

 ∏
e∈Φe,de≥rp
F|ge|2
(
xdαe
ρeaκ
)
 . (9)
Following the similar approach as [33], by applying the
generating function [34], (9) can be rewritten as
FγEκ (x) = exp
[
−λe
∫
R2
(
1− F|ge|2
(
xdαe
ρeaκ
))
rdr
]
=exp
[
−2πλe
∫ ∞
rp
re−
x
ρeaκ
rαdr
]
. (10)
By applying [35, Eq. (3.381.9)], we arrive at:
FγEκ (x) = e
−
δpiλe(ρeaκ)
δΓ
(
δ,
xrαp
ρeaκ
)
xδ . (11)
By taking the derivative of the CDF FγEκ (x) in (11), we
obtain the PDF γEκ in (8). The proof is completed.
5FγBm (x) ≈ U
(
x− am
an
)
+ U
(
am
an
− x
)
ϕm
M−m∑
p=0
(
M −m
p
)
(−1)p
m+ p
∑
S˜
p
m
(
m+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
k=0
bqkk
)
e
−
K∑
k=0
qkck
x
(am−anx)ρb .
(5)
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
In the networks considered, the capacity of the LU’s channel
for the κ-h user (κ ∈ {m,n} ) is given by CBκ = log2(1 +
γBκ), while the capacity of the Eve’s channel for the κ-th
user is quantified by CEκ = log2(1+ γEκ). It is assumed that
the length of the block is sufficiently high for facilitating the
employment of capacity-achieving codes within each block.
Additionally, the fading block length of the main channel and
of the eavesdropper’s channel are assumed to be the same. As
such, according to [36], the secrecy rate of the n-th and of the
m-th user can be expressed as
Cn = [CBn − CEn ]+, (12)
Cm = [CBm − CEm ]+, (13)
where we have [x]+ = max{x, 0}. Here, the secrecy rates of
LUs are strictly positive [37]. Recall that the Eves’ CSIs are
unknown at the BS, hence the BS can only send information
to the LUs at a constant rate, but perfect secrecy is not always
guaranteed [38]. Considering the κ-th user as an example, if
Rκ < Cκ, the information with a rate of Rκ (κ ∈ {m,n}
is conveyed in perfect secrecy. By contrast, for the case of
Rκ > Cκ the information-theoretic security is compromised.
Motivated by this, secrecy outage probability is used as our
secrecy performance metric in this paper. Given the expected
secrecy rate Rκ of the κ-th user, a secrecy outage event is
declared, when the secrecy rate Cκ drops below Rκ, which
is defined as the SOP for the κ-th user. Recall that we have
allocated M users to M/2 orthogonal RBs, each pair of users
are independent from all other pairs of users. We focus our
attention on the SOP of a typical pair of users. We then derive
the SOP of the κ-th user in the following two Theorems.
We consider the SOP under the condition that the connection
between BS and LUs can be established.
Theorem 1. Assuming that the LUs position obeys the PPP
for the ordered channels of the LUs, the SOP of the n-th user
is given by (14) at the top of this page.
Proof: In this treatise, we consider the SOP under the
condition that the connection between the BS and LUs can
be established. As such, the SIC has been assumed to be
successfully performed at the n-th user. Based on (12), the
SOP is given by
Pn (Rn) =
∫ ∞
0
fγEn (x)FγBn
(
2Rn (1 + x)− 1) dx. (15)
Upon using the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, substi-
tuting (4) and (8) into (15), after some further mathematical
manipulations, we can express the SOP of the n-th user. The
proof is completed.
Theorem 2. Assuming that the LUs position obeys the PPP
for the ordered channels of the LUs, the SOP of the m-th
user is given by (16) at the top of next page, where we have
τm =
1
2Rm (1−am)
− 1.
Proof: Based on (13) and according to [37], the SOP for
the m-th user is given by
Pm (Rm) =
∫ ∞
0
fγEm (x)FγBm
(
2Rm (1 + x)− 1) dx.
(17)
Upon using the results of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, as
well as substituting (5) and (8) into (17), after some further
mathematical manipulations, we can express the SOP of the
m-th user. The proof is completed.
In this paper, based on the assumptions of perfect SIC of
LUs and strong detection capabilities of Eves aforementioned,
the secrecy outage occurs in the m-th user and the n-th user are
independent. Note that relaxing these two assumptions requires
to consider dependence between two users by discussing more
sophisticated connect/secrecy outage events, which should be
included in our future work with the aid of the results derived
in this paper. In other words, the SOP of the m-th user has
no effect on the SOP of the n-th user and vice versa. As a
consequence, we define the SOP for the selected user pair as
that of either the m-th user or the n-th user outage.
Proposition 1. The SOP of the selected user pair is given by
Pmn = 1− (1− Pm) (1− Pn) , (18)
where Pn and Pm are given by (14) and (16), respectively.
C. Secrecy Diversity Order Analysis
In order to derive the secrecy diversity order to gain
further insights into the system’s operation in the high-SNR
regime, the following new analytical framework is introduced.
Again, as the worst-case scenario, we assume that Eves have
a powerful detection capability. The asymptotic behavior is
analyzed, usually when the SNR of the channels between the
BS and LUs is sufficiently high, i.e., when the BS’s transmit
SNR obeys ρb → ∞, while and the SNR of the channels
between BS and Eves is set to arbitrary values. It is noted
that for the Eve’s transmit SNR of ρe → ∞, the probability
of successful eavesdropping will tend to unity. The secrecy
diversity order can be defined as follows:
ds = − lim
ρb→∞
logP∞
log ρb
, (19)
where P∞ is the asymptotic SOP.
6Pn (Rn) =ϕn
M−n∑
p=0
(
M − n
p
)
(−1)p
n+ p
∑
S˜
p
n
(
n+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
K=0
bqkk
)
×
∫ ∞
0
µn1
(
µδn2e
−µn2x
x
+
δΓ (δ, µn2x)
xδ+1
)
e
−
µn1Γ(δ,µn2x)
xδ
−
K∑
k=0
qkck
2Rn (1+x)−1
ρban dx. (14)
Pm (Rm) =1− e−
µm1Γ(δ,τmµm2)
τm
δ + ϕm
M−m∑
p=0
(
M −m
p
)
(−1)p
m+ p
∑
S˜
p
m
(
m+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
k=0
bqkk
)
×
∫ τm
0
µm1
(
µδm2e
−µm2x
x
+
δΓ (δ, µm2x)
xδ+1
)
e
−
µm1Γ(δ,µm2x)
xδ
−
K∑
k=0
qkck
2Rm (1+x)−1
(am−an(2Rm (1+x)−1))ρb dx. (16)
Corollary 1. Assuming that the LUs position obeys the PPP
for the ordered channels of the LUs, the asymptotic SOP of
the n-th user is given by
P∞n (Rn) = Gn(ρb)
−Dn + o
(
ρ−Dnb
)
, (20)
where we have Q1 =
∫∞
0
µn1e
−
µn1Γ(δ,µn2x)
xδ ×(
µδn2e
−µn2x
x
+ δΓ(δ,µn2x)
xδ+1
)(
(2Rn (1+x)−1)ℓ
an
)n
dx,
Gn =
ϕnQ1
n
, and Dn = n.
Proof: We commence our diversity order analysis by
characterizing the CDF of the LUs F∞γBm and F∞γBn in the
high-SNR regime. When y → 0, based on (A.3) and the
approximation of 1 − e−y ≈ y, we obtain the asymptotic
unordered CDF of
∣∣∣h˜n∣∣∣2 as follows:
F∞|h˜n|2 (y) ≈
2y
R2D
∫ RD
0
(1 + rα) rdr = yℓ, (21)
where ℓ = 1+ 2R
α
D
α+2 . Substituting (21) into (A.2), the asymptotic
unordered CDF of
∣∣∣h˜n∣∣∣2 is given by
F∞|hn|2 (y) = ϕn
M−n∑
p=0
(
M − n
p
)
(−1)p
n+ p
(yℓ)
n+p ≈ ϕn
n
(yℓ)
n
.
(22)
Then based on (A.1), we can obtain F∞γBn (x) ≈
ϕn
n
(
xℓ
ρban
)n
.
Based on (15), we can replace the CDF of FγBn by the
asymptotic F∞γBn . After some manipulations, we arrive at the
asymptotic SOP of the n-th user. The proof is completed.
Remark 1. Upon substituting (20) into (19), we obtain the
secrecy diversity order of the n-th user is n.
Corollary 2. Assuming that the LUs position obeys the PPP
for the ordered channels of the LUs, the asymptotic SOP for
the m-th user is given by
P∞m (Rn) = Gm(ρb)
−Dm + o
(
ρ−Dmb
)
, (23)
where we have Q2 =
∫ τm
0
µm1e
−
µm1Γ(δ,µm2x)
xδ ×(
µδm2e
−µm2x
x
+ δΓ(δ,µm2x)
xδ+1
)(
(2Rm (1+x)−1)ℓ
(am−an(2Rm (1+x)−1))
)m
dx,
Gm =
ϕmQ2
m
and Dm = m.
Proof: Based on Φm and (22), we can arrive at:
Φ∞m ≈
ϕm
m
(
xℓ
(am − anx) ρb
)m
. (24)
Substituting (24) into (6), the asymptotic CDF of γBm can be
expressed as
F∞γBm (x) = U
(
x− am
an
)
+ U
(
am
an
− x
)
Φ∞m , (25)
where Φ∞m is given in (24). Then, based on (17), we can
replace the CDF of FγBm by the asymptotic F∞γBm of (25).
Additionally, we can formulate the asymptotic SOP of the m-th
user. The proof is completed.
Remark 2. Upon substituting (23) into (19), we obtain the
secrecy diversity order of the m-th user is m.
Proposition 2. For m < n, the secrecy diversity order can be
expressed as
ds = − lim
ρb→∞
log (P∞m + P
∞
n − P∞m P∞n )
log ρb
= m. (26)
Proof: Based on Corollary 2 and Corollary 1, and upon
substituting (20) and (23) into (18), the asymptotic SOP for
the user pair can be expressed as
P∞mn =P
∞
m + P
∞
n − P∞m P∞n ≈ P∞m Gm(ρb)−Dm . (27)
Upon substituting (27) into (19), we arrive at (26). The proof
is completed.
Remark 3. The results of (26) indicate that the secrecy
diversity order and the asymptotic SOP for the user pair
considered are determined by the m-th user.
Remark 3 provides insightful guidelines for improving the
SOP of the networks considered by invoking user pairing
among of the M users. Since the SOP of a user pair is
determined by that of the one having a poor channel, it is
efficient to pair the user having the best channel and the second
best channel for the sake of achieving an increased secrecy
diversity order.
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Fig. 2: Network model for secure NOMA transmission using
AN in multiple-antenna scenario, where rp, RD1 , RD2 , and
∞ is the radius of the Eve-exclusion zone, NOMA user zone
for user n, NOMA user zone for user m, and an infinite two
dimensional plane for eavesdroppers, respectively.
III. ENHANCING SECURITY WITH THE AID OF ARTIFICIAL
NOISE
In addition to single antenna scenario [1], for further im-
proving the secrecy performance, let us now consider the
employment of multiple antennas at BS for generating AN
in order to degrade the Eves’ SNR. More particularly, the
BS is equipped with NA antennas, while all LUs and Eves
are equipped with a single antenna each. Here, NA > 2
is assumed for ensuring the existence of a null-space for
two NOMA users. We mask the superposed information of
NOMA by superimposing AN on Eves with the aid of the
BS. It is assumed that the perfect CSI of LUs are known at
BS4. Since the AN is in the null space of the intended LU’s
channel, it will not impose any effects on LUs. However, it
can significantly degrade the channel and hence the capacity of
Eves. More precisely, the key idea of using AN as proposed
in [39] can be described as follows: an orthogonal basis of
CNA is generated at BS for user κ, (where κ ∈ {m,n}) as a
(NA ×NA)–element precoding matrix Uκ = [uκ,Vκ], where
we have uκ = h
†
κ
/
‖hκ‖ , and Vκ is of size NA× (NA − 1).
Here, hκ is denoted as the intended channel between the BS
and user κ. It is noted that each column of Vκ is orthogonal to
uκ. Beamforming is applied at the BS for generating AN. As
such, the transmitted superposed information, which is masked
by AN at the BS is given by∑
κ∈{m,n}
√
aκxκ =
∑
κ∈{m,n}
√
aκ (sκuκ + tκVκ) , (28)
where sκ is the information-bearing signal with a variance of
σ2s , and tκ is the AN. Here the (NA − 1) elements of tκ are
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian
random variables with a variance of σ2a. As such, the overall
power per transmission is PT = PS+PA, where PS = θPT =
4In practical scenarios, estimating the CSI may be a non-trivial task,
therefore, our work actually provides an upper bound in terms of the attainable
secrecy performance.
σ2s is the transmission power of the desired information-
bearing signal, while PA = (1− θ)PT = (NA − 1) σ2a is the
transmission power of the AN. Here θ represents the power
sharing coefficients between the information-bearing signal
and AN.
As shown in Fig. 2, we divide the disc D into two regions,
namely, D1 and D2, respectively. The motivation of using
this topology hinges on two aspects. The first one is to create
more distinct channel quality differences between the paired
users, since existing NOMA studies have demonstrated that it
is beneficial to pair two users having rather different channel
conditions [5, 11, 40]. The second one is that of reducing the
complexity of channel ordering in this MISO NOMA system,
which provides a compelling flexibility. By doing so, the path
loss is the dominant channel impairment in this scenario, be-
cause compared to the instantaneous small-scale fading effects,
the path loss is more stable and more dominant. A quantitative
example of comparing the small-scale fading and path loss was
provided in Chapter 2 of [41]. Note that the proposed design
cannot guarantee the optimal ordering for MISO NOMA chan-
nels. More sophisticated precoding/detection design strategies
(e.g., cluster based design, signal alignment and etc.) can be
developed for further enhancing the attainable performance
of the networks considered [42, 43], but this is beyond the
scope of this treatise. Here, D1 is an internal disc with radius
RD1 , and the group of user n is located in this region. D2
is an external ring spanning the radius distance from RD1 to
RD2 , and the group of user m is located in this region. For
simplicity, we assume that user n and user m are the selected
user from each group in the rest of this paper. The cell-center
user n is assumed to be capable of cancelling the interference
of the cell-edge user m using SIC techniques5. User n and
user m are randomly selected in each region for pairing them
for NOMA. The combined signal at user m is given by
ym =
hmum
√
amsm√
1 + dαm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Signal part
+
hmun
√
ansn√
1 + dαm
+
hmVn
√
antn√
1 + dαm
+ nm︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interference and noise part
,
(29)
where nm is a Gaussian noise vector at user m, while dm
is the distance between the BS and user m. Substituting (28)
into (29), the received SINR at user m is given by
γANBm =
amσ
2
s‖hm‖2
anσ2s
∣∣∣hm h†n‖hn‖ ∣∣∣2 + anσ2a‖hmVn‖2 + 1 + dαm
, (30)
where the variance of nm is normalized to unity. As such, we
can express the transmit SNR at BS as ρt = PT .
Since SIC is applied at user n, the interference arriving from
user m can be detected and subtracted firstly. The aggregate
5Note that upon invoking the signal alignment technique [43], the BS is
capable of simultaneously supporting multiple pairs of NOMA users, by
designing more sophisticated precoding/detection strategies for interference
cancelation. However, these considerations are beyond the scope of this paper.
8signal at user n is given by
yn =
hnun
√
ansn√
1 + dαn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Signal part
+
hnVm
√
amtm√
1 + dαn
+ nn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interference and noise part
, (31)
where nn is the Gaussian noise at user n, while dn is the
distance between the BS and user n. The received SINR at
user n is given by
γANBn =
anσ
2
s‖hn‖2
amσ2a‖hnVm‖2 + 1 + dαn
, (32)
where the variance of nn is normalized to unity. The signal
observed by Eves is given by
ye =
∑
κ∈{m,n}
he
√
aκxκ√
dαe
+ ne, (33)
where ne is the Gaussian noises at Eves, while he ∈ C1×NA
is the channel vector between the BS and Eves. Similar to the
single-antenna scenario, again, we assume that the Eves have
a strong detection capability and hence they unambiguously
distinguish the messages of user m and user n. The received
SINR of the most detrimental Eve associated with detecting
user κ is given by
γANEκ = aκσ
2
s max
e∈Φe,de≥rp
{
Xe,κ
IANe + d
α
e
}
, (34)
where the variance of ne is normalized to unity, and we have
Xe,κ =
∣∣∣he h†κ‖hκ‖ ∣∣∣2 as well as IANe = amσ2a‖heVm‖2 +
anσ
2
a‖heVn‖2.
A. New Channel Statistics
In this subsection, we derive several new channel statistics
for LUs and Eves in the presence of AN, which will be used
for deriving the SOP in the next subsection.
Lemma 4. Assuming that user n is randomly positioned in
the disc D1 of Fig. 2, the CDF of FANBn is given by
FANBn (x) = 1− b2e−
ϑx
am
NA−1∑
p=0
ϑpxp
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
×
Γ (NA − 1 + q) aq−pm(
ϑx+ NA−1
PA
)NA−1+q
p−q∑
u=0
(
p− q
u
)au+δm γ (u+ δ, ϑxamRαD1)
(ϑx)
u+δ
,
(35)
where we have b2 = δ
R2
D1
Γ(NA−1)
(
PA
NA−1
)NA−1 and ϑ = amanPS .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Lemma 5. Assuming that user m is randomly positioned in
the ring D2 of Fig. 2, for the case of θ 6= 1NA , the CDF of
FANBm is given by
FANBm (x) = 1− e−
νx
an
NA−1∑
p=0
(νx)p
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
aq−pn ×
a1

 Γ (q + 1)(
νx+ 1
PS
)q+1 − NA−2∑
l=0
(
NA−1
PA
− 1
PS
)l
l!
(
νx+
NA−1
PA
)q+l+1
Γ(q+l+1)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
I(θ)
×
p−q∑
u=0
(
p− q
u
)γ (u+ δ, νx
an
RαD2
)
− γ
(
u+ δ, νx
an
RαD1
)
(
νx
an
)u+δ , (36)
where γ (·, ·) is the lower incomplete Gamma
function, Γ (·) is the Gamma function, a1 =
δ
(
1− PA(NA−1)PS
)1−NA
/
((
R2D2 −R2D1
)
PS
)
, and
ν = an
amPS
.
For the case of θ = 1
NA
, the CDF of FANBm is given by(36) upon substituting I (θ) by I∗ (θ), where we have I∗ (θ) =
a2Γ(q+NA)(
νx+ 1
PS
)q+NA
p−q∑
u=0
(
p−q
u
)
and a2 = δ(
R2
D2
−R2
D1
)
PS
NA (NA−1)!
.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Lemma 6. Assuming that the distribution of Eves obeys a
PPP and that the Eve-exclusion zone has a radius of rp, the
PDF of fγAN
Eκ
(where κ ∈ {m,n}) is given by
fγAN
Eκ
(x) = −eΘκΨκ1×((
µANκ2
)δ
e−xµ
AN
κ2
x
Ψκ1 +
δΘκΨκ1
x
+ΘκΨκ2
)
, (37)
where Θκ =
Γ(δ,xµANκ2 )
xδ
, Γ (·, ·) is the upper incom-
plete Gamma function, Ψκ1 = Ω 1(
x
aκPS
+τi
)j ,Ψκ2 =
Ω 1(
x
aκPS
+τi
)j
(
j(
x
aκPS
+τi
) 1
aκPS
)
, Ω = (−1)NAµANκ1 ×
2∏
i=1
τNA−1i
2∑
i=1
NA−1∑
j=1
aNA−j,NA−1(2τi − L)j−(2NA−2) , L =
τ1 + τ2, τ1 =
NA−1
amPA
, τ2 =
NA−1
anPA
, aNA−j,NA−1 =
(
2NA−j−3
NA−j−1
)
,
µANκ1 = πλeδ(aκPS)
δ
, and µANκ2 =
rαp
aκPS
.
Proof: See Appendix D.
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we investigate the SOP of a multiple-
antenna aided scenario relying on AN.
Theorem 3. Assuming that the LUs and Eves distribution
obey PPPs and that AN is generated at the BS, the SOP of
user n is given by (38) at the top of next page, where ιn∗ =
ϑ(2Rn (1+x)−1)
am
.
Proof: Using the results of Lemma 4 and Lemma 6, upon
substituting (35) and (37) into (15), we can obtain the SOP
of user n. The proof is completed.
Theorem 4. Assuming that the LUs and Eves distribution
obey PPPs and that AN is generated at the BS, for the case
9PANn (Rn) =
∫ ∞
0
−eΘnΨn1
((
µANn2
)δ
e−xµ
AN
n2
x
Ψn1 +
δΘnΨn1
x
+ΘnΨn2
)
×

1− b2e−ιn NA−1∑
p=0
ιn∗
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
Γ (NA − 1 + q) aqm(
amιn∗ +
NA−1
PA
)NA−1+q
p−q∑
u=0
(
p− q
u
)
γ
(
u+ δ, ιn∗R
α
D1
)
ιu+δn∗

 dx, (38)
PANm (Rm) =
∫ ∞
0
−eΘmΨm1
((
µANm2
)δ
e−xµ
AN
m2
x
Ψm1 +
δΘmΨm1
x
+ΘmΨm2
)
×

1− a∗1 NA−1∑
p=0
ιpm
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
aqn

 Γ (q + 1)(
anιm∗ +
1
PS
)q+1 − NA−2∑
l=0
1
l!
(
NA−1
PA
− 1
PS
)l
Γ (q + l + 1)(
anιm∗ +
NA−1
PA
)q+l+1

T∗1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
K(θ)
dx, (39)
θ 6= 1
NA
, the SOP of user m is given by (39) at the top of
next page, where we have a∗1 =
δe−ιm∗
(
1−
PA
(NA−1)PS
)1−NA
(
R2D2
−R2D1
)
PS
,
T∗1 =
p−q∑
u=0
(
p−q
u
)γ(u+δ,ιm∗RαD2)−γ(u+δ,ιm∗RαD1)
ιu+δm∗
, and ιm∗ =
ν(2Rm (1+x)−1)
an
.
For the case of θ = 1
NA
, the SOP for user m is given by
(39) upon substituting K(θ) with K∗ (θ), where K∗ (θ) = 1−
a∗2
NA−1∑
p=0
ιpm∗
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
) Γ(q+NA)aqn(
anιm∗+
1
PS
)q+NA
p−q∑
u=0
(
p−q
u
)
T∗1, and a∗2 =
δe−ιm∗(
R2
D2
−R2
D1
)
PS
NA (NA−1)!
.
Proof: Using the results of Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, upon
substituting (36) and (37) into (17), we obtain the SOP of user
m. The proof is completed.
Proposition 3. The SOP of multiple-antenna aided scenario
relaying on AN for the selected user pair can be expressed as
PANmn = 1−
(
1− PANm
) (
1− PANn
)
. (40)
where Pn and Pm are given by (38) and (39), respectively.
C. Large Antenna Array Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the system’s asymptotic
behavior when the BS is equipped with large antenna ar-
rays. Large antenna arrays using narrow beamforming are
potentially capable of distinguishing multiple users in the
angular domain [44, 45]. Nonetheless, the users covered by
the same narrow beam in dense deployments still remain
non-orthogonal [46]. It is noted that for the exact SOP
derived in (39) and (38), as NA increases, the number of
summations in the equations will increase exponentially, which
imposes an excessive complexity. Motivated by this, we seek
good approximations for the SOP associated with a large
NA. With the aid of the theorem of large values, we have
the following approximations [24]. lim
NA→∞
‖hn‖2 → NA,
lim
NA→∞
‖hm‖2 → NA, lim
NA→∞
‖hnVm‖2 → NA − 1, and
lim
NA→∞
‖hmVn‖2 → NA − 1. We first derive the asymptotic
CDF of user n for NA →∞.
Lemma 7. Assuming that user n is randomly located in the
disc D1 of Fig. 2 and NA →∞, the CDF of FANBn,∞ is given
by
FANBn,∞ (x) =


0, x < ζn
1−
(
anPSNA
x
−amPA−1
)δ
R2
D1
, ζn ≤ x ≤ ξn
1, x ≥ ξn
,
(41)
where we have ζn = anPSNARα
D1
+amPA+1
and ξn = anPSNAamPA+1 .
Proof: Based on (32), we can express the asymptotic CDF
of FANBn,∞ as FANBn,∞ (x) = Pr
{
anPSNA
amPA+1+dαn
≤ x
}
. After some
further mathematical manipulations, we can obtain the CDF
of FANBn,∞ for large antenna arrays. The proof is completed.
We then derive the asymptotic CDF of user m for NA →∞.
Lemma 8. Assuming that user m is randomly located in the
ring D2 of Fig. 2 and NA →∞, the CDF of FANBm,∞ is given
by
FANBm,∞ (x) =


1, x ≥ ζm1
R2D2
−t2m+b1e
−
amPSNA
xanPS
R2D2
−R2D1
× ∫ tm
RD1
re
rα
anPS dr, ζm2 < x ≤ ζm1
b1e
−
amPSNA
xanPS
R2D2
−R2D1
∫ RD2
RD1
re
rα
anPS dr, x < ζm2
,
(42)
where we have b1 = 2e
anPA+1
anPS , tm =
α
√
amPSNA
x
− anPA − 1, ζm1 = amPSNARαD1+anPA+1 , ζm2 =
amPSNA
Rα
D2
+anPA+1
, and ξm = amPSNAanPA+1 .
10
Proof: Similarly, based on (30),the CDF of the asymptotic
FANBm,∞ is given by
FANBm,∞ (x) = Pr

 amPSNAanPS∣∣∣hm h†n‖hn‖ ∣∣∣2 + anPA + 1 + dαm
≤ x

 .
(43)
After some further mathematical manipulations, we obtain
the CDF of FANBm,∞ for large antenna arrays. The proof is
completed.
Let us now turn our attention to the derivation of the Eves’
PDF in a large-scale antenna scenario.
Lemma 9. Assuming that the Eves distribution obeys a PPP
and that AN is generated at the BS, the Eve-exclusion zone
has a radius of rp, and NA →∞, the PDF of fγANEκ,∞ (where
κ ∈ {m,n}) is given by
fγANEκ,∞
(x) = e
−
µANκ1 Γ(δ,µANκ2 x)e
−
PAx
aκPS
xδ
−
PAx
aκPS µANκ1 x
−δ
×
((
µANκ2
)δ
xδ−1e−µ
AN
κ2 x + Γ
(
δ, µANκ2 x
)( PA
aκPS
+
δ
x
))
.
(44)
Proof: Using the theorem of large values, we have
lim
NA→∞
IANe,∞ = amσ
2
a‖heVm‖2 + anσ2a‖heVn‖2 → PA. The
asymptotic CDF of FγAN
Eκ,∞
associated with NA →∞ is given
by
FγAN
Eκ,∞
(x) = Pr
{
max
e∈Φe,de≥rp
{
aκPSXe,κ
IANe,∞ + d
α
e
}
≤ x
}
= EΦe

 ∏
e∈Φe,de≥rp
FXe,κ
(
(PA + d
α
e ) x
aκPS
)
 . (45)
Following the procedure used for deriving (10), we apply the
generating function and switch to polar coordinates. Then with
the help of [35, Eq. (3.381.9)], (45) can be expressed as
FγAN
Eκ,∞
(x) = exp
[
−µ
AN
κ1 Γ
(
δ, µANκ2 x
)
xδ
e
−
PAx
aκPS
]
. (46)
Taking derivative of (46), we obtain the PDF of fγANEκ,∞ . The
proof is completed.
Remark 4. The results derived in (44) show that the PDF of
fγAN
Eκ,∞
is independent of the number of antennas NA in our
large antenna array analysis.
Let us now derive the SOP for our large antenna array
scenario in the following two Theorems.
Corollary 3. Assuming that the LUs and Eves distribution
obey PPPs, AN is generated at the BS and NA → ∞, the
TABLE I: Table of Parameters
Monte Carlo simulations repeated 106 times
The radius of a disc region for Eves 1000 m
power sharing coefficients of NOMA am = 0.6, an = 0.4
Targeted secrecy rates Rm = Rn = 0.1 BPCU
Pass loss exponent α = 4
The radius of the user zone of Section II RD = 10 m
The radius of the user zone of Section III RD1 = 5 m, RD2 = 10 m
SOP for user n is given by
PANn,∞ (Rn) = 1− e−
µANn1 Γ(δ,µANn2 χn2)
(χn2)
δ e
−
PAχn2
anPS
+ µANn1
∫ χn2
χn1
e
−
µANn1 Γ(δ,µANn2 x)e
−
PAx
anPS
xδ
−
PAx
anPS Ξ2
×
(
1− 1
R2D1
(
anPSNA
2Rn (1 + x)− 1 − amPA − 1
)δ)
dx, (47)
where χn1 = ζn+12Rn − 1, χn2 = ξn+12Rn − 1, and Ξ2 =
x−δ
((
µANn2
)δ
xδ−1e−µ
AN
n2 x + Γ
(
δ, µANn2 x
) (
PA
anPS
+ δ
x
))
.
Proof: Using the results of Lemma 7 and Lemma 9, upon
substituting (41) and (44) into (15), we can express the SOP
for user n.
Corollary 4. Assuming that the LUs and Eves
distribution obey PPPs, AN is generated at the BS,
and NA → ∞, the SOP for user m is given by (48)
at the top of the next page, where we have Ξ1 =
x−δ
(
µANm2
(
µANm2 x
)δ−1
e−µ
AN
m2 x + Γ
(
δ, µANm2 x
) (
PA
amPS
+ δ
x
))
,
Λ1 =
∫ RD2
RD1
re
rα
anPS dr,Λ2 =
∫ tm∗
RD1
re
rα
anPS dr,
tm∗ = α
√
amPSNA
2Rm (1+x)−1 − anPA − 1, and χm2 = ζm2+12Rm − 1.
Proof: Using the results of Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, upon
substituting (42) and (44) into (17), we can express the SOP
for user m. The proof is completed.
Proposition 4. Under the assumption of NA → ∞, the SOP
of multiple-antenna aided scenario relaying on AN for the
selected user pair can be expressed as
PANmn,∞ = 1−
(
1− PANm,∞
) (
1− PANn,∞
)
. (49)
where PANn,∞ and PANm,∞ are given by (47) and (48), respec-
tively.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, our numerical results are presented for
characterizing the performance of large-scale networks. The
complexity-vs-accuracy tradeoff parameter is K = 20. Table I
summarizes the the Monte Carlo simulation parameters used
in this section. BPCU is short for bit per channel use.
A. Secrecy outage probability with channel ordering
From Fig. 3 to Fig. 5, we investigate the secrecy perfor-
mance in conjunction with channel ordering, which correspond
to the scenario considered in Section II.
Fig. 3 plots the SOP of a single user (m-th and n-th) versus
ρb for different user zone radii. The curves represent the exact
11
PANm,∞ (Rm) = 1− e−
µANκ1 Γ(δ,µANκ2 χm1)
(χm1)
δ e
−
PAχm1
aκPS
+
µANm1 b1Λ1
R2D2 −R2D1
∫ χm2
0
e
−
µANm1 Γ(δ,µANm2 x)e
−
PAx
amPS
xδ
−
amPSNA
(2Rm (1+x)−1)anPS
−
PAx
amPS Ξ1dx
+
µANm1
R2D2 −R2D1
∫ χm1
χm2
e
−
µANm1 Γ(δ,µANm2 x)e
−
PAx
amPS
xδ
−
PAx
amPS
(
R2D2 − t2m∗ + b1e
−
amPSNA
(2Rm (1+x)−1)anPS
)
Ξ1Λ2dx, (48)
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Fig. 3: The SOP versus ρb, with ρe = 10 dB, α = 4,
λe = 10
−3
, M = 2, m = 1, n = 2, and rp = 10 m. The
exact analytical results are calculated from (16) and (14). The
asymptotic analytical results are calculated from (20) and (23).
analytical SOP of both the m-th user and of n-th user derived
in (16) and (14), respectively. The asymptotic analytical SOP
of both the m-th and n-th users, are derived in (23) and (20),
respectively. Fig. 3 confirms the close agreement between the
simulation and analytical results. A specific observation is that
the reduced SOP can be achieved by reducing the radius of
the user zone, since a smaller user zone leads to a lower path-
loss. Another observation is that the n-th user has a more
steep slope than the m-th user. This is due to the fact that we
have m < n and the m-th user as well as n-th user achieve
a secrecy diversity order of m and n respectively, as inferred
from (23) and (20).
Fig. 4 plots the SOP of the selected user pair versus the
transmit SNR ρb for different path-loss factors. The exact
analytical SOP curves are plotted from (18). The asymptotic
analytical SOP curves are plotted from (27). It can be observed
that the two kinds of dashed curves have the same slopes.
By contrast, the solid curves indicate a higher secrecy outage
slope, which is due to the fact that the secrecy diversity order
of the user pair is determined by that of the poor one. This
phenomenon is also confirmed by the insights in Remark 1.
Fig. 5 plots the SOP of the selected user pair versus
rp for different densities of the Eves. We can observe that
as expected, the SOP decreases, as the radius of the Eve-
exclusion zone increases. Another option for enhancing the
PLS is to reduce the radius of the user zone, since it reduces
the total path loss. It is also worth noting that having a lower
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Fig. 4: The SOP of user pair versus ρb, with ρe = 10 dB,
λe = 10
−3
, RD = 10 m, M = 3, and rp = 10 m. The exact
analytical results are calculated from (18). The asymptotic
analytical results are calculated from (27).
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Fig. 5: The SOP of user pair versus rp, with ρb = 50 dB,
ρe = 40 dB, M = 2, m = 1, n = 2, and α = 4. The exact
analytical results are calculated from (18).
E density λe results in an improved PLS, i.e. reduced SOP.
This behavior is due to the plausible fact that a lower λe
results in having less Eves, which degrades the multiuser
diversity gain, when the most detrimental E is selected. As
a result, the destructive capability of the most detrimental
E is reduced and hence the SOP is improved. It is worth
pointing out that dynamic power sharing between two users is
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Fig. 6: The SOP versus θ, with α = 4, RD1 = 5 m, RD2 =
10 m, λe = 10
−4
, NA = 4, ρt = 30 dB. The exact analytical
results are calculated from (39) and (38).
capable of improving the secrecy performance of the scenarios
considered, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Secrecy outage probability with artificial noise
From Fig. 6 to Fig. 10, we investigate the secrecy perfor-
mance in the presence of AN, which correspond to the scenario
considered in Section III.
Fig. 6 plots the SOP of user m and user n versus θ for
different Eve-exclusion zones. The solid and dashed curves
represent the analytical performance of user m and user
n, corresponding to the results derived in (39) and (38).
Monte Carlo simulations are used for verifying our derivations.
Fig. 6 confirms a close agreement between the simulation and
analytical results. Again, a reduced SOP can be achieved by
increasing the Eve-exclusion zone, which degrades the channel
conditions of the Eves. Another observation is that user n
achieves a lower SOP than user m, which is explained as
follows: 1) user n has better channel conditions than user
m, owing to its lower path loss; and 2) user n is capable
of cancelling the interference imposed by user m using SIC
techniques, while user m suffers from the interference inflicted
by user n. It is also worth noting that the SOP is not a
monotonic function of θ. This phenomenon indicates that there
exists an optimal value for power allocation, which depends
on the system parameters.
Fig. 7 plots the SOP of user m and user n versus λe
for different number of antennas. We can observe that the
SOP decreases, as the E density is reduced. This behavior
is caused by the fact that a lower λe leads to having less
Eves, which reduces the multiuser diversity gain, when the
most detrimental E is considered. As a result, the distinctive
capability of the most detrimental E is reduced and hence the
secrecy performance is improved. It is also worth noting that
increasing the number of antennas is capable of increasing the
secrecy performance. This is due to the fact that ‖hm‖2 in (30)
and ‖hn‖2 in (32) both follow Gamma (NA, 1) distributions,
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Fig. 7: The SOP versus λe, with θ = 0.8, α = 4, RD1 = 5 m,
RD2 = 10 m, ρt = 30 dB, rp = 4 m. The exact analytical
results are calculated from (39) and (38).
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Fig. 8: The SOP of the user pair versus NA, with RD1 = 5 m,
RD2 = 10 m, α = 3, λe = 10
−3
, ρt = 30 dB.
which is the benefit of the improved multi-antenna diversity
gain.
Fig. 8 plots the SOP of the selected user pair versus NA
for different path loss exponents. In this figure, the curves
representing the case without AN are generated by setting
θ = 1, which means that all the power is allocated to the
desired signal. In this case, the BS only uses beamforming
for transmitting the desired signals and no AN is generated.
The curves in the presence of AN are generated by setting
θ = 0.9. We show that the PLS can be enhanced by using
AN. This behavior is caused by the fact that at the receiver
side, user m and user n are only affected by the AN generated
by each other; By contrast, the Eves are affected by the AN
of both user m and user n. We can observe that the SOP of
the selected user pair decreases, as the Eve-exclusion radius
increases.
Fig. 9 plots the SOP of the selected user pair versus ρt and
θ. It is observed that the SOP first decreases then increases as
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α = 4, RD1 = 5 m, RD2 = 10 m, λe = 10
−4
, rp = 10 m.
The exact analytical results are calculated from (40).
ρt increases, which is in contrast to the traditional trend, where
the SOP always decreases as the transmit SNR increases.
This behavior can be explained as follows. The SOP of the
selected user pair is determined by user m. As ρt increases,
on the one hand, the signal power of user m is increased,
which improves the secrecy performance; On the other hand,
user m also suffers from the interference imposed by user n
(including both the signal and AN), because when ρt increases,
the signal power of user n is also increased, which in turn
degrades the secrecy performance. As a consequence, there is
a tradeoff between ρt and the SOP. It is also noted that the
power sharing factor θ also affect the optimal SOP associated
with different values of ρt. This phenomenon indicates that it
is of salient significance to select beneficial system parameters.
Furthermore, optimizing the parameters ρt and θ is capable of
further improving the SOP.
Fig. 10 plots the SOP of large antenna arrays of the selected
user pair versus NA parameterized by different transmit SNRs.
The dashed curves represent the analytical SOP of the selected
user pair, corresponding to the results derived in (49). We
observe a close agreement between the theoretical analysis
and the Monte Carlo simulations, which verifies the accuracy
of our derivations. We observe that as NA increases, the
approximation used in our analysis approaches the exact SOP.
This phenomenon indicates that the asymptotic SOP derived
converges to the exact values, when NA is a sufficiently large
number.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the secrecy performance of applying the
NOMA protocol in large-scale networks was examined.
Specifically, stochastic geometry based techniques were used
for modeling both the locations of NOMA users and of the
Eves in the networks considered. Additionally, new analytical
SOP expressions were derived for characterizing the system’s
secrecy performance in both single-antenna and multiple-
antenna scenarios. For the single-antenna scenario, the secrecy
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Fig. 10: Large analysis for the SOP of user pair versus NA,
with θ = 0.8, RD1 = 5 m, RD2 = 10 m, λe = 10−4,
rp = 5 m. The asymptotic analytical results are calculated
from (49).
diversity order of the user pair was also characterized. It was
analytically demonstrated that the secrecy diversity order was
determined by that one of the user pair who had a poorer
channel. For the multiple-antenna scenario, it was shown that
the Eves’ channel quality is independent of the number of
antennas at the BS for large antenna array scenarios. Numer-
ical results were also presented for validating the analysis. It
was concluded that the secrecy performance can be improved
both by extending the Eve-exclusion zone and by generating
AN at the BS. Assuming perfect SIC operations may lead to
overestimating the performance of the networks considered,
hence our future research may consider investigating imperfect
SIC. Optimizing the power sharing between two NOMA users
is capable of further improving the secrecy performance of
the networks considered, which is another promising future
research direction.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To derive the CDF of FγB , based on (2), we can formulate
FγB (x) = Pr
{
ρban|hn|2 ≤ x
}
= F|hn|2
(
x
ρban
)
, (A.1)
where F|hn|2 is the CDF of the ordered channel gain for the
n-th user. Assuming y = x
ρban
, and using order statistics [47]
as well as applying binary series expansion, the CDF of
the ordered channels has a relationship with the unordered
channels captured as follows:
F|hn|2 (y) = ϕn
M−n∑
p=0
(
M − n
p
)
(−1)p
n+ p
(
F|h˜n|2 (y)
)n+p
,
(A.2)
where F|h˜n|2 is the CDF of unordered channel gain for the
n-th user.
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Based on the assumption of homogeneous PPP, and by
relying on polar coordinates, F|h˜n|2 is expressed as
F|h˜n|2 (y) =
2
R2D
∫ RD
0
(
1− e−(1+rα)y
)
rdr. (A.3)
However, it is challenging to arrive at an easily implemented
insightful expression for F|h˜n|2 (y). Therefore, the Gaussian-
Chebyshev quadrature relationship [48] is invoked for finding
an approximation of (A.3) in the following form:
F|h˜n|2 (y) ≈
K∑
k=0
bke
−cky. (A.4)
Substituting (A.4) into (A.2) and applying the multinomial
theorem, the CDF F|hn|2 of ordered channel gain is given by
F|hn|2 (y) ≈ ϕn
M−n∑
p=0
(
M − n
p
)
(−1)p
n+ p
×
∑
S˜
p
n
(
n+ p
q0 + · · ·+ qK
)( K∏
k=0
bqkk
)
e
−
K∑
k=0
qkcky
. (A.5)
Substituting y = x
ρban
into (A.5), we can obtain (4). The
proof is completed.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Based on (32), we express the CDF of FANBn as follows:
FANBn (x) = Pr
{
‖hn‖2 ≤ xϑ
(
PA
NA − 1Yn +
1 + dαn
am
)}
= 1−
NA−1∑
p=0
ϑpxp
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
Q3
×
∫
D1
e−
ϑx
am
(1+dαn)
(
1
am
(1 + dαn)
)p−q
fD1 (ωn) dωn, (B.1)
where ϑ = am
anPS
, Q3 =
∫∞
0 e
−ϑxznzqnfIANn (zn) dzn,
fIANn and fD1 (ωn) are the PDF of I
AN
n and D1. Here
IANn =
PA
NA−1
Yn, Yn = ‖hnVm‖2, and fD1 (ωn) = 1πR2D1 .
Upon changing to polar coordinates and applying [35, Eq.
(3.381.8)], we arrive at
FANBn (x) =1−
δe−
ϑx
am
R2D1
NA−1∑
p=0
ϑpxp
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
Q3a
q−p
m
×
p−q∑
u=0
(
p− q
u
)γ (u+ δ, ϑx
am
RαD1
)
(
ϑx
am
)u+δ . (B.2)
Finally we turn our attention on Q3. It is readily seen
that IANn obeys the Gamma distribution in conjunction
with the parameter
(
NA − 1, PANA−1
)
. Then we can obtain
the PDF of fIANn (zn) =
z
NA−2
n e
−
zn(NA−1)
PA(
PA
NA−1
)NA−1
Γ(NA−1)
. Apply-
ing [35, Eq. (3.326.2)], we can express Q3 as Q3 =
Γ(NA−1+q)
Γ(NA−1)
(
PA
NA−1
)NA−1(
ϑx+
NA−1
PA
)NA−1+q . Upon substituting
Q3 into (B.2), we obtain the CDF of FANBn (x) as (35).
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Based on (30), we express the CDF of FANBm as
FANBm (x) = Pr
{
γANBm ≤ x
}
= Pr

 amσ
2
s‖hm‖2
anσ2s
∣∣∣hm h†n‖hn‖ ∣∣∣2 + anσ2a‖hmVn‖2 + 1 + dαm
≤ x

 .
(C.1)
It may be readily seen that ‖hm‖2 obeys a Gamma distribution
having the parameters of (NA, 1). Hence the CDF of ‖hm‖2
is given by
FANBm (x) = 1− e−x
NA−1∑
p=0
xp
p!
. (C.2)
Denoting Xm =
∣∣∣hm h†n‖hn‖ ∣∣∣2, Ym = ‖hmVn‖2, based on
(C.2), we can re-write (C.1) as
FANBm (x) = Pr
{
‖hm‖2 ≤ xν
(
IANm +
1 + dαm
an
)}
= 1−
∫
D2
∫ ∞
0
NA−1∑
p=0
(
νx
(
zm +
1+dαm
an
))p
p!
×
(
e−νxzm−νx
1+dαm
an
)
fIANm (zm) fD2 (ωm) dzmdωm, (C.3)
where ν = an
amPS
, fIANm and fD2 are the PDF of I
AN
m
and D2, respectively. Here we have IANm = σ2sXm + σ2aYm
and fD2 (ωm) = 1
π
(
R2D2
−R2D1
)
. Applying a binary series
expansion to (C.3), we arrive at:
FANBm (x) = 1−
NA−1∑
p=0
νpxp
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
Q1
×
∫
D2
e−νx
1+dαm
an
(
1 + dαm
an
)p−q
fD2 (ωm) dωm, (C.4)
where Q1 =
∫∞
0
e−νxzmzqmfIANm (zm) dzm. Note that the
distance dm is determined by the location of ωm. Then we
change to polar coordinates and applying a binary series
expansion again, we obtain
FANBm (x) = 1−
2e−
νx
an
R2D2 −R2D1
NA−1∑
p=0
νpxp
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
×Q1 1
ap−qn
p−q∑
u=0
(
p− q
u
)∫ RD2
RD1
ruα+1e−νxPSr
α
dr. (C.5)
By invoking [35, Eq. (3.381.8)], we obtain
FANBm (x) = 1−
2e−
νx
an
R2D2 −R2D1
NA−1∑
p=0
νpxp
p!
p∑
q=0
(
p
q
)
Q1
1
ap−qn
×
p−q∑
u=0
(
p− q
u
)γ (u+ δ, νx
an
RαD2
)
− γ
(
u+ δ, νx
an
RαD1
)
α
(
νx
an
)u+δ .
(C.6)
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Let us now turn our attention to the derivation of the integral
Q1 in (C.4) – (C.6). Note that Xm follows the exponential
distribution with unit mean, while Ym follows the distribution
Ym ∼ Gamma (NA − 1, 1). As such, the PDF of fIANm is
given by [25]
fIANm (zm) =


t1
e
zm
PS
(
1−
NA−2∑
l=0
(
NA−1
PA
− 1
PS
)l
zlm
l!e
(
NA−1
PA
− 1
PS
)
zm
)
, θ 6= 1
NA
z
NA−1
m e
−
zm
PS
PS
NA (NA−1)!
, θ = 1
NA
,
(C.7)
where we have t1 =
(
1−
PA
(NA−1)PS
)1−NA
PS
. Based on (C.7), and
applying [35, Eq. (3.326.2)], we can express Q1 as follows:
Q1 =


t1Γ(q+1)(
xν+ 1
PS
)q+1 −
NA−2∑
l=0
t1
l!
(
NA−1
PA
− 1
PS
)l
Γ(q+l+1)(
νx+
NA−1
PA
)q+l+1 , θ 6= 1NA
Γ(q+NA)
PS
NA (NA−1)!
(
νx+ 1
PS
)q+NA , θ = 1NA
.
(C.8)
Upon substituting (C.8) into (C.6), the CDF of FANBm is given
by (36).
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Based on (34), the CDF of FγANEκ can be expressed as
FγAN
Eκ
(x) = Pr
{
max
e∈Φe,de≥rp
{
aκPSXe,κ
IANe + d
α
e
}
≤ x
}
= EΦe

 ∏
e∈Φe,de≥rp
∫ ∞
0
FXe,κ
(
(z + dαe )x
aκPS
)
fIANe (z) dz

 .
(D.1)
Following a procedure similar to that used for obtaining
(10), we apply the generating function and switch to polar
coordinates. Then (D.1) can be expressed as
FγANEκ
(x) = exp
[
−2πλe
∫ ∞
rp
re
− x
aκPS
rα
drQ2
]
, (D.2)
where Q2 =
∫∞
0
e
−z x
aκPS fIANe (z) dz. Applying [35, Eq.(3.381.9)], we arrive at
FγAN
Eκ
(x) = exp
[
−µ
AN
κ1 Γ
(
δ, µANκ2 x
)
xδ
Q2
]
. (D.3)
Let us now turn our attention to solving the integral
Q2. Note that all the elements of heVm and heVn are
independent complex Gaussian distributed with a zero mean
and unit variance. We introduce the notation Ye,m =
‖heVm‖2 and Ye,n = ‖heVn‖2. As a consequence, both
Ye,m and Ye,n obey the Gamma (NA − 1, 1) distribution.
Based on the properties of the Gamma distribution, we
have amσ2aYe,m ∼ Gamma
(
NA − 1, amσ2a
)
, anσ
2
aYe,n ∼
Gamma
(
NA − 1, anσ2a
)
. Then the sum of these two items
IANe obeys the generalized integer Gamma (GIG) distribution.
According to [49], the PDF of IANe is given by
fIANe (z) =(−1)
NA−1
2∏
i=1
τNA−1i
2∑
i=1
NA−1∑
j=1
aNA−j,NA−1
(j − 1)! (2τi − L)
j−(2NA−2)zj−1e−τiz.
(D.4)
Upon substituting (D.4) into (D.3), as well as applying [35,
Eq. (3.381.4)], after some further manipulations, we obtain the
CDF of FγAN
Eκ
as
FγANEκ
(x) = exp

Ω Γ
(
δ, xµANκ2
)
j∑
p=0
(
j
p
)
(x)
p+δ
(aκPS)
−p
τ j−pi

 . (D.5)
Upon setting the derivative of the CDF in (D.5), we can obtain
(37).
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